# AIR POWER FOR PATTON'S ARMY

# The XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War

David N. Spires

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# In Memory of Colonel John F. "Fred" Shiner, USAF (1942–1995)

#### **Foreword**

This insightful work by David N. Spires holds many lessons in tactical air-ground operations. Despite peacetime rivalries in the drafting of service doctrine, in World War II the immense pressures of wartime drove army and air commanders to cooperate in the effective prosecution of battlefield operations. In northwest Europe during the war, the combination of the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air Command led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland proved to be the most effective allied air-ground team of World War II.

The great success of Patton's drive across France, ultimately crossing the Rhine, and then racing across southern Germany, owed a great deal to Weyland's airmen of the XIX Tactical Air Command. This deft cooperation paved the way for allied victory in Westren Europe and today remains a classic example of air-ground effectiveness. It forever highlighted the importance of air-ground commanders working closely together on the battlefield.

The Air Force is indebted to David N. Spires for chronicling this landmark story of air-ground cooperation.

RICHARD P. HALLION Air Force Historian

#### **Editor's Note**

One of the striking features of this story is the broad sweep taken by Third Army and XIX Tactical Air Command across France. It demanded a large number of maps be used to show places and activities in ways that words could not. However, to the greatest extent possible this work relies on maps prepared by contemporaneous creators, and thus has a number of maps reproduced from original histories of the period. Moreover, those which came from other sources largely were taken from the *West Point Atlas of American Wars*, a pair of volumes produced for the use of classes at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. That volume has maps in larger format and with more explanation, so readers who wish to study the maps in greater detail are referred to that source, listed with each map.

#### **Preface**

Air Power for Patton's Army is a case study of one air-ground team's experience with the theory and practice of tactical air power employed during the climactic World War II campaigns against the forces of Nazi Germany. By the summer of 1944, the Allies had four fighter-bomber tactical air commands supporting designated field armies in northwest Europe, and in the fall they added a fifth (making four American and one British). Of these, the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland deserve special attention as perhaps the most spectacular air-ground team of the Second World War on the Allied side.

From the time Third Army became operational on August 1, 1944, until the guns fell silent on May 8, 1945, Patton's troops covered more ground, took more enemy prisoners, and suffered more casualties than any other Allied army in northwest Europe. General Weyland's XIX TAC was there every step of the way: in the high summer *blitzkrieg* across France to the Siegfried Line, in the battle of attrition and positional warfare in Lorraine reminiscent of World War One's western front, in the emergency drive to rescue American troops trapped at Bastogne and help clear the Ardennes of Germans in the Battle of the Bulge, and finally, in crossing the Rhine and charging across southern Germany to the Czech and Austrian borders. There, Third Army forces linked up with Soviet military units converging on the fabled German Redoubt area from the east.

This study does not suggest that Weyland's XIX TAC proved superior to other tactical air commands in the European theater or that Weyland emerged as the only effective air leader. Indeed, numerous laurels were garnered by Weyland's colleagues and their respective TACs: Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada's IX TAC that supported the First Army, Brig. Gen. Richard Nugent's XXIX TAC that supported the Ninth Army, and Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville's XII TAC that supported the Seventh Army *and* the French First Army. Moreover, during Ninth Air Force's eight-month buildup prior to Overlord (the invasion of France in June 1944), IX TAC, under an innovative General Quesada, played the central role in preparing for air operations at Normandy and on the continent. General Weyland remained in the background until Patton's forces entered combat on August 1, 1944. Because the XIX TAC entered combat later, it could and did use to good advantage the valuable experience of the IX TAC.

Traditional army and air force antagonisms and unsound tactical air doctrine are frequently cited as the major impediments to smooth air-ground relations and effective combat operations. Much of that contention was apparent

in Washington, D.C., even during World War II, where, facing the demands of a worldwide conflict, headquarters' staffs all too frequently focused on problems of intraservice and interservice competition at all levels. For military leaders and staffs in Washington, service politics often took precedence and preferred doctrine often served to buttress disagreement. With their respective service priorities and in their role as advocates, these officers viewed matters of doctrine more rigidly than did their counterparts in the field. For them, unalloyed service doctrine prescribed the right conduct of air-ground relations; deviations could hardly be tolerated.

In the turbulent postwar period, Army Air Forces (AAF) leaders moved swiftly and purposefully to create an independent Air Force. In the late 1940s many U.S. Army officers, with some justification, worried that the new U.S. Air Force's absolute control of tactical airplanes and equipment, its doctrinal assertions, and its overwhelming focus on strategic priorities in the emergent Cold War meant that the army would receive less rather than more tactical air support for ground combat operations. In the charged atmosphere of that day, critics often found fault with the air-ground relationship forged during the Second World War and returned to doctrinal citation and interpretation when supporting one position or another in air-ground disagreements or other controversy. Had the various partisans reflected instead on the cooperative, wartime air-ground record of those "comrades in arms" in the XIX TAC-Third Army in Europe, they would have found their worst fears refuted, as indeed they would find similar fears refuted today. When genuflecting before the altars of doctrine in peacetime, it seems the absolute importance of pairing military leaders of goodwill in wartime who respect, trust, and rely on their service counterparts as comrades in arms is easily forgotten.

In preparing this study, I received help from many quarters. Above all I wish to thank Dennis Showalter and Daniel Mortensen for their unflagging support and enthusiasm for the project. Dennis read the entire manuscript and, as always, offered insightful comments and unstinting encouragement. Dan generously shared his wealth of knowledge on tactical aviation in general and Operation Torch, in particular. It was he who first called my attention to the cooperative, rather than confrontational, nature of air-ground relations. I remain in his debt.

Individuals at two major military archives also deserve special thanks. My friend Elliott V. Converse III, a former commander of the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, went far beyond the call of duty to support my research efforts. As a result, I benefited from the knowledge and helpfulness of the agency's outstanding group of archivists and historians: Richard E. Morse, Robert M. Johnson, James H. Kitchens, Timothy D. Johnson, Archangelo DiFante, Marvin Fisher, Sarah Rawlins, and SSgt. Edward Gaines. They made special arrangements to accommodate my every request for information on the XIX TAC and related tactical aviation

subjects. Joseph Caver in the Research Division had copied from Weyland's XIX TAC scrapbook many of the pictures that appear in this volume. I am grateful to John Slonaker, archivist at the USA Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, who introduced me to a wealth of information on the Army and Army Air Forces, beginning with Third Army's magnificent *After Action Report* of its 1944–45 campaign. Mr. Slonaker also went out of his way to help with long-distance requests.

I also wish to express my appreciation to the people in Norlin Library's Inter-Library Loan Department at the University of Colorado. They enjoyed nothing better than to pursue my requests for obscure military reference material. Their success record was outstanding and I am grateful. Several others assisted on specific areas of the work. Jerold E. Brown of the Army's Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth supplied me with important material on the Lorraine Campaign and shared his understanding of the Army's special long-term interest in it. David MacIsaac willingly tracked down Gen. James Ferguson's television interview and provided useful information on the Battle of the Bulge. My friend Bang Nguyen assisted enormously with the maps and charts.

Special thanks are owed several former participants in World War II tactical air campaigns in Europe, and I will always be grateful for the privilege of sharing their recollections and insights. They are Lt. Gen. John J. Burns, 371st Fighter Group P–47 pilot; Maj. Gen. Robert L. Delashaw, Commander, 405th Fighter Group; Brig. Gen. Russell A. Berg, Commander, 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group; Gen. James Ferguson, XIX TAC Combat Operations Officer; and Gen. Robert M. Lee, Ninth AF Deputy Commander for Operations.

I am especially indebted to Cargill Hall, the person responsible for contract histories at the Air Force History and Museums Program, who carefully edited the final manuscript and helped make the story more readable, understandable, and convincing. Others who read and contributed most helpful suggestions are: Perry D. Jamieson, Eduard Mark, David R. Mets, Daniel R. Mortensen, John Schlight, Richard K. Smith, David Tretler, and Herman S. Wolk. Any errors of fact or interpretation that remain, of course, are my own.

At the end of this project I am more than ever convinced that the tale of Generals Weyland and Patton, of the XIX TAC teamed with the U.S. Third Army in the Second World War, deserves to be told. These men's achievements continue to inspire and instruct, and I am pleased to spread the word.

David N. Spires Boulder, Colorado

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